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We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations
into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in
the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous
empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language
from thought, making the question concerning “influence” pointless. The second is the
argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and
from social interaction in particular, so it is impossible to attribute any differences in
the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third
issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the
most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual
information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence
thought from “not at all” to “completely,” the possible forms of linguistic influence can be
placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position
on this cline. We analyze these claims and show that the first three do not constitute
in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic
influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way to frame the empirical
challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for
linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that
such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations.
Keywords: consciousness, culture, discourse, language, relativity, thought, Whorf
INTRODUCTION
The two related questions if and how language aﬀects the mind go back to the dawn of
contemplative thought. Since thought and language are intimately connected, some form of close
relationship between the two has often been assumed. The recurrent debate, with oscillating
tendencies, has been whether it is mostly thought that inﬂuences language, or vice versa (Zlatev,
2008a). The thesis that language has a non-negligible eﬀect on thinking, combined with the
claim that languages are non-trivially diﬀerent, has been generally known as “the Sapir–Whorf
hypothesis.” This is a rather misleading label, introduced by Carroll (1956) in the preface to the
well-known collection of papers by Benjamin LeeWhorf Language, thought and reality. In fact, the
original idea did not amount to an empirical hypothesis, but to what wewould today call a “research
program,” and its main promotor was Whorf. With 60-years long hindsight, we can now observe
that after a prolonged period of scientiﬁc mistrust, what Whorf (1956, p. 213) dubbed the principle
of linguistic relativity appears to ﬁnd a substantial degree of support in interdisciplinary research
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from the past two decades (Lucy, 1992, 1997; Pederson, 1995;
Gumperz and Levinson, 1996; Slobin, 1996; Boroditsky, 2001;
Gentner and Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Levinson, 2003; Casasanto
et al., 2004; Majid et al., 2004; Casasanto, 2008; Casasanto and
Boroditsky, 2008; Boroditsky and Gaby, 2010; Wolﬀ and Holmes,
2011; Lupyan, 2012).
At the same time, the thesis that language inﬂuences thought,
in one or more possible ways, especially when combined
with the thesis of linguistic relativity, continues to be highly
controversial, and every now and then provokes sweeping
criticisms, describing the enterprise as fatally ﬂawed (Pinker,
1994; McWhorter, 2014). On the other hand, some proponents
of the thesis have also been relatively one-sided (Durst-Andersen,
2011). Perhaps it is as stated by Ellis (1993, p. 55): “[T]he
Whorf hypothesis seems to bring out the worst in those who
discuss it.”
In this article, we wish to take a few steps back, and
consider the following objections that have been leveled at
the project. First, some have proposed that the question of
language inﬂuencing thought is conceptually unsound: since
the two cannot even be distinguished, thought cannot exist
independently of language. A second objection is that it is
impossible to disentangle language from culture in general,
and from social interaction in particular, so it is impossible to
attribute diﬀerences in the thought patterns of the members
of diﬀerent cultural communities to the structures of language.
A third critique states that the strong thesis of linguistic
inﬂuence is methodologically circular, or else false, while the
weak thesis is trivial. A fourth issue is not so much an
objection as something that has been presented in the way
of a practical solution to the dilemma: since language can
potentially inﬂuence thought from “not at all” to “completely,”
theoretical proposals can be arranged on a cline from “weak”
to “strong,” and the only issue is to determine the place of
linguistic inﬂuence on the cline, presumably toward the weak
end.
We examine each one of these issues in turn. To anticipate,
concerning the ﬁrst three objections, we propose that the
force of the critique has been overstated and the conceptual
problems can be avoided. With respect to the ﬁnal point,
we argue that at least some “language inﬂuence” theories
diﬀer not quantitatively but qualitatively, according to two
independent dimensions. Our aim is thus to show that
much of the dismissive critique against language-thought
inﬂuence and linguistic relativity is unsatisfactory, and thereby
to pave the way for further research. While we often refer
to relevant empirical ﬁndings, our aim is not primarily
empirical – to answer how exactly language inﬂuences
thought – but to clarify the semiotic space surrounding
the debate. The outcome of this clariﬁcation is (minimally)
the conclusion that it is fully possible for language to
inﬂuence thought, and that it remains to determine the
ways in which this possibility is actualized in practice (Wolﬀ
and Holmes, 2011). Such cross-fertilization of conceptual
and empirical concerns is characteristic of the new ﬁeld of
cognitive semiotics (Zlatev, 2012) which the present approach
instantiates.
DISENTANGLING LANGUAGE FROM
THOUGHT
A classical objection against the possibility of cogently posing
the question of linguistic inﬂuence on thought is to reject the
proposition that the latter could even exist in the absence of
language. Philosophers, at least since Humboldt (who wrote:
“. . .the idea is born, becomes an object and returns, perceived
anew as such, into the subjective mind. For this, language is
inevitable,” quoted and translated by Zinken, 2008, fn. 10), have
often been inclined to such a radical position, implying that
without language we would be thought-less, or even mindless.
While this view still has its champions among philosophers
(Dennett, 1991; Macphail, 1998), it is harder to ﬁnd it represented
in psychology or the language sciences. Still, some researchers
following Humberto Maturana (e.g., Maturana, 1988), who
placed an especially heavy emphasis on the role of language (or
languaging) for the “construction of reality,” appear to accept a
version of this view:
An existing impasse in the study of this relationship (i.e., between
language and mind) cannot be overcome as long as the problem
itself is not reformulated to rid it of the intrinsically dualistic
assumption that there is, in fact, a phenomenon called ‘language’
that is ontologically independent of the phenomenon called
‘mind.’ [. . .] mind cannot be understood without and outside of
language.
(Kravchenko, 2011, p. 355)
It is quite possible to agree with such claims in some respects,
e.g., that treating language and thought as fundamentally
diﬀerent “modules” or “representations” is mistaken (Lupyan,
2012), but nevertheless maintain that language and thought
should not be equated, since doing so would short-circuit the
crucial question concerning their interrelation (Vygotsky, 1962).
A convenient deﬁnition of language, adopted in some of
our earlier work is that of a predominantly conventional
semiotic system for communication and thought (Zlatev, 2007,
2008b). This comprises the point that languages are essentially
“socially shared symbolic systems” (Nelson and Shaw, 2002),
which have evolved over millennia and develop in children
over years, to serve two main functions: sharing experiences
and enhancing cognition. Indeed, this deﬁnition implies that
thought is not impossible without language and that it is
possible to treat the two phenomena as distinct, e.g., “Language
invades our thinking because languages are good to think
with” (Bowerman and Levinson, 2001, p. 584). By “thought,”
we mean essentially mediated cognition. This corresponds
approximately to what are sometimes called “higher cognitive
processes,” in which the mind is not fully immersed in the
practical concerns of the here-and-now, but rather employs
various structures and processes of conscious awareness such
as mental imagery, episodic memories or explicit anticipations
to focus on intentional objects that are not perceptually
present. We believe that this corresponds fairly well to the
folk-psychological concept of “thought” and “thinking.” It
is worthwhile distinguishing this, at least analytically, from
non-mediated forms of cognition, including (conscious and
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non-conscious) processes of perception, movement, procedural
memory and implicit anticipation. We propose that the issue of
“linguistic inﬂuence on thought” can be circumscribed in this
way. This does not exclude the possibility that language may in
some cases even “modulate” perception (Lupyan, 2012), as the
attested presence of such modulation – in nearly all cases found
to be transitory and context-dependent – can also be interpreted
as an instance of linguistic mediation.
Given these explications of the key concepts, what is the
evidence that it is language alone that can give rise to thought,
or in other words: serve as the “sole mediator” of cognition?
Phenomenological analysis (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945;
Husserl, 1989/1952) and psychological research all show that
mediated cognition is possible without language. For example,
monkeys are capable of making decisions on the basis of
judgments of whether a given stimulus is familiar or not, which is
diﬃcult to explain without episodic memory (Griﬃn and Speck,
2004). Chimpanzees and orangutans are apparently capable of
planning for the (near) future (Osvath and Osvath, 2008), and
at least chimpanzees and bonobos display behaviors such as
consolation and tactical deception which require one to place
oneself “in the shoes” of someone else, known as cognitive
empathy (Preston and de Waal, 2002). Of course, there are
forms of thinking that are indisputably linguistically mediated:
internal speech, complex planning, and an autobiographic self-
concept (Nelson, 1996). Few would doubt that language plays
a constitutive role in such “linguistic thought,” though many
questions remain concerning the extent to which this is so, and by
which “mechanisms” this is realized (Bowerman and Levinson,
2001; Casasanto, 2008; Wolﬀ and Holmes, 2011). The point is
that not all instances of thought, and even less so of cognition
in general, are co-extensive with language. Thus, the question of
linguistic inﬂuence on thought can be formulated fairly simply: to
what extent and in which ways does language mediate cognition?
A counter-claim could be that even if thought and language
can be in principle (ontologically) distinguished, this is not
possible methodologically – for “languaging” creatures such as
us. This issue presents itself clearly in empirical research on
linguistic relativity: as with Einstein’s principle of relativity,
some form of stable “reality” is presupposed to be able to
establish the diﬀerences between “measurements” or perspectives
in the ﬁrst place. This reality need not, as the invariance of
light in Einstein’s theory, be understood as something that is
strictly mind-independent, but rather as the world of perception
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945). Many readers of the supposed
relativist Whorf are surprised to ﬁnd multiple references to such
a universal level of experience.
To compare ways in which diﬀerent languages diﬀerently
‘segment’ the same situation of experience, it is desirable to
analyze or ‘segment’ the experience ﬁrst in a way independent of
any language or linguistic stock, a way which will be the same for
all observers
(Whorf, 1956, p. 162).
In describing diﬀerences between [languages] . . . we must have a
way of describing phenomena by non-linguistic standards and by
terms that refer to experience as it must be to all human beings,
irrespective of their languages or philosophies
(Whorf and Trager, 1938, p. 6).
Even if other passages of Whorf ’s writings can be read
as proposing that thought is fully dependent on language
(Brown, 1976), quotations such as these clearly show that
Whorf accepted a pre-linguistic mode of representation
that was yet unaﬀected by language, and hence the need to
compare languages with respect to the degrees to which they
departed from such experience. Indeed, as the quotations
above imply, Whorf even regarded this as a methodological
necessity. This position is accepted in all current empirical
research in linguistic relativity, such as the active ﬁeld of
motion event typology (Talmy, 2000), where it is investigated
whether cross-linguistic diﬀerences in motion expressions
correlate with non-linguistic categorizations (e.g., Slobin,
2003). Such studies presuppose prior analyses of the domain
itself, i.e., analyses that necessitate the possibility to classify
experience “independent of any language or linguistic
stock.” In previous work, we have proposed exactly such an
analysis of motion on the basis of three binary parameters
(TRANSLOCATIVE, BOUNDED, CAUSED), distinguishing between
eight kinds of motion situations (Zlatev et al., 2010). This
provided a better conceptual basis for describing semantic
diﬀerences between languages in the expression of motion
(Blomberg, 2014) than the original Talmian framework. Such
an analysis is a necessary precondition for asking Whorﬁan
questions.
To summarize, deﬁning language and thought in a way that
is both true to the phenomena, and allowing them to be both
distinguished and co-related, is a ﬁrst prerequisite for further
investigations into their relationship. Occasional claims that
such distinction is ontologically or methodologically impossible
seem to derive from strong theoretical biases rather than from
conceptual necessity or empirical evidence.
DISASSOCIATING LANGUAGE AND
CULTURAL CONTEXT
Somewhat similarly to the critique from the previous section
Björk (2008) argues that current studies in linguistic relativity,
often referred to as “neo-Whorﬁan” (cf. McWhorter, 2014) adopt
a simpliﬁed and static view of language:
The neo-Whorﬁan studies investigate the role of linguistic
diversity in the language-and-thought relation, and language is
thus explored primarily as ‘particular languages,’ such as English,
Tzeltal, Dutch, or Yucatec Maya. The particular languages are
viewed as demarcated, cognitively represented systems, in which
linguistic meaning is inherent. That is, linguistic meaning is given
by the system, prior to any particular situation of language use.
The term ‘language,’ that sometimes comes into the discussion
about relativity as opposed to ‘languages,’ seems to refer to general
aspects of having ‘a language,’ a code. When communication is
mentioned, this too seems to be a general aspect of using ‘a
language.’
(Björk, 2008, pp. 125–126)
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Of course, there is more to language than using a particular
‘code’: actual, situated language use, which is also tightly
intertwined with socio-cultural practices. For example, a study
of linguistic eﬀects on spatial cognition would be simplistic if
it only considered “spatial expressions” like prepositions. These
should rather be seen as elements in social practices, or “language
games” (Wittgenstein, 1953), inseparable from the activities in
which they participate in, like asking for directions and specifying
the location of objects, events, places, and people. In other words,
language needs to be understood as socio-culturally situated:
“Linguistic meaning is inextricable from the social practices
(language games), in which language is used. The mastery of a
language is embedded in, and in important ways formative of,
one’s cultural background” (Zlatev, 1997, p. 5). Consequently, it is
only actual linguistic practices that can have an eﬀect on thought.
To claim that linguistic structures – as a distinct and separate
“variable” – can function as causes of cognitive diﬀerences in
the speakers of diﬀerent languages is to evoke abstract, and
ontologically suspicious, entities as causes (Berthele, 2013).
As before, we can in part agree with such a critique, but
believe that it both exaggerates the problem, and underestimates
the methodological sophistication of neo-Whorﬁan research,
where factors such as usage frequency are taken into account
(Slobin, 1996; Casasanto, 2008). Conceptually, the notion of
language should indeed include, and possibly even privilege
situationally and culturally embedded discourse. But this does
not mean that the ontology of language should be restricted to
such discourse, and thereby exclude “particular languages,” such
as English, Tzeltal, Dutch, or the general notion of having a
language, associated with particular universal properties (such
as displaced reference and predication). These three aspects:
situated discourse, particular language and language in general
actually appear as distinct levels of language in the meta-linguistic
framework of Coseriu (1985), as shown in his matrix of levels
and perspectives, displayed in Table 1. This explicitly pluralistic
and non-reductionist linguistic ontology (cf. Zlatev, 2011) not
only acknowledges the existence of universal, historical, and
situated levels of language (vertically), but also of diﬀerent
perspectives on each of these (horizontally): language as creative
activity, as competence and as product. All these are to some
degree independent, but complementary and interacting aspects
of language. In line with Björk (2008), we can agree that the
most “real” or actual aspect of language is that of discourse,
since it is both most “alive,” unfolding in the communication
TABLE 1 | Coseriu’s matrix; adapted from Coseriu (1985; see also Zlatev,
2011), highlighting Discourse as the privileged, but non-exclusive aspect
of language.
Perspectives
Levels Activity Competence Product
Universal Speaking in general Encyclopedic and logical Totality of
utterances
Historical Speaking a
particular language
Linguistic “Lexicon and
grammar”
Situated Discourse Communicative Text
between speakers and hearers, and most contextualized. At the
same time, discourse will be constrained by the grammatical
and semantic norms of the particular language, as well as
of potentially universal aspects of pragmatics, such as the
cooperative principle (Grice, 1975). While the linguistic norms
of a language community do not determine actual speech, and
hence the thought processes related to it, the “historical” level
clearly inﬂuences that of discourse, in a way that is analogous
to the ways social norms inﬂuence social behavior (Itkonen,
2008).
The discussion so far concerned the relations between
language-as-system and language-as-discourse, showing that
while the two are closely related, the system level is neither an
epiphenomenon, nor a ﬁgment of the imagination of (structural)
linguists, and hence has the potential to be “causally eﬃcacious.”
However, one may grant this, but still deny that the system of
lexical and grammatical norms can be dissociated from other
aspects of culture, such as shared beliefs and attitudes. Thus,
to the extent that there are diﬀerences in thought, these should
be attributed to cultures rather than languages (cf. McWhorter,
2014). In fact, Whorf and his predecessors Boas and Sapir,
always considered the possibility of cultural beliefs and practices
interacting with “grammatical patterns as interpretations of
experience” (Whorf, 1956, p. 137) in a reciprocal manner. It has,
however, been more diﬃcult to provide evidence for a direct
causal link from such beliefs to any aspect of “habitual thought”
that could be empirically attested. Everett’s (2005) proposal that
the high value that the Pirahã attach to “direct experience” is
the main reason for their language lacking numerals and many
aspects of grammatical complexity such as hierarchical structure,
is a case to the point: while not lacking plausibility, the claim
has remained strongly controversial and diﬃcult to validate.
A stronger case can be made that it is the “habitual patterns”
of language – possibly reﬂecting some particular aspect of the
respective culture – that exercise such eﬀects. As Levinson (2005,
p. 638) writes:
Everett [. . .] prefers an account in terms of the causal eﬃcacy of
culture, but no one interested in language diversity would make
a simple dichotomy between language and culture: a language of
course is a crucial part of a culture and is adapted to the rest
of it. [. . .] The question neo-Whorﬁans are interested in is how
culture gets into the head, so to speak, and here language appears
to play a crucial role: it is learnt far earlier than most aspects of the
culture, is the most highly practiced set of cultural skills, and is a
representational system that is at once public and private, cultural,
and mental.
Methodologically, studies have been designed so as to attempt
to tease apart the respective roles of language and other aspects of
culture, for example by including speakers from languages where
certain particular linguistic structures are similar, while there are
many other cultural diﬀerences, e.g., Yucatec Maya and Japanese
(Lucy, 1992). Indeed, in this study the participants of the two
groups behaved similarly with respect to object categorization,
and diﬀerently from, e.g., speakers of English, and this could be
plausibly attributed to the extensive use of nominal classiﬁers in
both Yucatec Maya and Japanese.
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Conversely, one may test speakers from populations that are
very similar culturally, and even linguistically – apart from one
particularly relevant variable. This was the case in Pederson’s
(1995) study comparing speakers of Tamil who preferentially
used a “relative” reference frame for locating objects in space, with
terms corresponding English left-right-front-back, with another
group of Tamil speakers who were familiar with this usage,
but preferred to use an “absolute” reference frame, with terms
corresponding to north-south-east-west. In other words, what
one group would tend to phrase as ‘the glass is to the left
of the plate,’ would be preferentially expressed in terms of
cardinal directions, e.g., ‘the glass is to the west of the plate,’
by the other. In experiments of the type that have since then
been used for a number of languages (Levinson, 2003), it
was shown that the two groups tended to solve non-linguistic
spatial tasks in ways that corresponded to their linguistic
preferences. These results are important since as Pederson (1995,
p. 40) writes, “this diﬀerence in habitual language use is not
deeply rooted in the grammatical system,” i.e., it was not a
matter of obligatory or “abstract” properties of two substantially
diﬀerent languages, but was rather a matter of preferences of
two very closely related dialects. Still these were suﬃcient to
give rise to diﬀerences in solving (apparently) non-linguistic
tasks.
Finally, the fact that there is a debate concerning the
respective causal roles of language structures and non-linguistic
cultural patterns is indicative enough that the distinction is
not only conceptually possible, but also empirically useful.
Ultimately, empirical evidence should be able to resolve some
particular debates on this matter. For example, Ji et al. (2005)
reported diﬀerences in styles of visual attention (“analytic”
vs. “holistic”) between East-Asian and American participants,
and attributed these to non-linguistic cultural diﬀerences:
individualist vs. collectivist values, respectively. Durst-Andersen
(2011) disagrees, and rather places languages as diverse as
Chinese, Russian, and Spanish in the (super)type of “reality-
oriented” languages, on the basis of common structural features
such as grammatical aspect. This implies that Russian and
Spanish speakers should behave like the Chinese, rather than
the North Americans in visual attention tasks. To the extent
that this prediction holds, the Whorﬁan interpretation would
be supported; if not, the proposal for some degree of “cultural
relativity” would retain its credibility. Finally, one may note that
what makes Nisbett’s thesis of cultural relativity more testable
than Everett’s, mentioned earlier, is precisely that it does not
concern a single culture but many diﬀerent ones, according
to a hypothetical typology. It is this that allows formulating
contrastive predictions.
“INTERESTING” AND “TRIVIAL” KINDS
OF LANGUAGE INFLUENCE?
In an inﬂuential review article, Bloom and Keil (2001) made
the distinction between two kinds of claims/theories of linguistic
inﬂuence on thought, referring to the ﬁrst as “interesting” and the
second as “trivial”:
[W]e do want to insist on the distinction between the interesting
claim that language induces theory change because of linguistic
structure (e.g., the particular words it has) vs. the trivial claim
that language induces theory change because of the information
it conveys. There is a big diﬀerence, after all, between arguing that
children’s developing theory of, say, the social world is shaped by
the speciﬁc lexical division that their languages make (interesting)
vs. arguing that children’s developing theory of the social world is
shaped by what they hear people talking about (trivial).
(Bloom and Keil, 2001, p. 362, original emphasis)
This passage merits some explanation. The authors here
assume a “theoretical” perspective on cognitive development,
according to which we build up (implicit) theories about the
world, including “theories” about other human beings and
ourselves (Gopnik and Meltzoﬀ, 1997). Hence, any act of
cognition that gives us new knowledge can be seen as “theory
change.” Now, it can be reasonably objected that cognition,
and even thought (in the sense of mediated cognition, see
Disentangling Language from Thought) involves processes such
as episodic memory, foresight and imagery that are very hard-
pressed into the frame of “theorizing.” But we may ignore
this, since the distinction that Bloom and Keil (2001) evoke
should remain even if we substitute “induces theory change” with
“inﬂuences thought” in the quotation above.
So what is meant by “linguistic structure” and why should
its possible inﬂuence on thought be “interesting”? At ﬁrst look,
one may think that this refers to a distinction made already
by Whorf (1956): the more limited eﬀects of lexical items, like
calling a barrel with dangerous fumes empty, and the much more
pervasive eﬀect of “grammatical patterns” (i.e., morphology and
syntax), which are used ubiquitously, and under less conscious
control. However, Bloom and Keil (2001) speciﬁcally refer to “the
particular words” a language has in exemplifying what they mean
by structure, which is indeed consistent with the rejection of
“a simple dichotomy between lexical and grammatical elements”
(Croft, 2003, p. 226) in most contemporary linguistics.
In fact, the distinction that the authors are aiming at
corresponds to the distinction between the historical (“structure”)
and the situated levels (“talk”) of language discussed in the
previous section (see Table 1). However, while we argued that
discourse, or actual situated language use is what has the potential
to inﬂuence thought, Bloom and Keil (2001) assume that only
system-level linguistic diﬀerences are worthy of being considered
as (interesting) causes of cognitive diﬀerences. On the face
of it, this is puzzling, since linguistic structures are always
realized in discourse (“talk”), and talk is never un-structured.
Why should the eﬀects on children’s cognitive development of
“what they hear people talking about” be considered trivial?
Apparently, since discourse and the knowledge it yields are
so pervasive: nearly everything that we learn without direct
perceptual experience is linguistically mediated (and more
recently, pictorially mediated as well): dinosaurs, angels, Mount
Everest, quarks, genes, etc. For example, the word quark denotes
a certain class of objects hypothesized by modern physics. By
means of the informational content of the term we delineate,
if not establish, the concept of the basic constituent of matter.
Still, Bloom and Keil (2001) discount such cognitive eﬀects, since
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words like quark apparently do not constitute a systematic aspect
of language.
However, the distinction “information vs. structure” is
problematic. As is well-known since at least de Saussure (1916),
the meaning of words in not exhausted by their referential
(“informational”) content, but also involves the web of relations
to other words. To take the previous example, the words quark,
basic, constituent and matter can be seen as systematically
interrelated: their meanings are to some degree inter-deﬁned, as
well as in relation to the “language game” of modern science that
they participate in. To take another example: is it not a structural
aspect of English that dinosaurs are (considered to be) reptiles,
while elephants are mammals, and so are dolphins, though the
latter were thought for a long time to be fish (and still are in
many other languages/cultures)? Such structure, as well as that
encoded in “grammatical patterns” of language, will of course
provide “information” during language learning and everyday
use. Thus, the dichotomy between information and structure that
Bloom and Keil’s view rests upon cannot be upheld: linguistic
information is always structured, and structural distinctions are
informative.
Further, if we consider the example of social cognition,
used by Bloom and Keil (2001) in the citation above, there
is considerable evidence that language contributes strongly to
children’s understanding of the concept of belief (and hence
of “false beliefs”). Indeed, at least two undeniably structural
features of language have been argued to contribute to this:
(a) mental predicates such as think, believe, know. . . and (b)
sentential complement constructions such as say that (de Villiers
and Pyers, 1997; Astington and Jenkins, 1999). On the other
hand, others have argued that such features are not the only, and
possibly not the primary factors that allow language acquisition to
inﬂuence social cognition. Tomasello (1999, p. 173) suggests that
typical features of linguistic interaction such as disagreements,
repairs and explanations constitute (at least) “three kinds
of discourse, each of which requires [children] to take the
perspective of another person” (Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003).
Finally, Hutto (2008) presents a book-length argument that the
crucial aspect of language that leads to proﬁciency in “folk
psychology” are all the stories that children are told. In sum,
both structural and informational aspects of language are likely
to contribute to developing concepts such as wish, intention,
reason, belief, and even more so for interrelating them into
discursive and holistic complexes such as “folk psychological
narrative.” Since the distinction between “talk” and “structure”
(and hence of their possible eﬀects on thought) is highly dubious,
there is nothing obviously trivial about the inﬂuence of the
former.
Let us consider the other prong of the dilemma that Bloom
and Keil (2001) set up for linguistic relativity (“interesting,
but wrong”). They ﬁrst point out a standard methodological
objection: that Whorf and many who have gone in his footsteps
use a circular argumentation where linguistic diﬀerences are
the sole evidence for cognitive diﬀerences. In fact, Whorf
was aware of this problem, and pointed out the need for
future studies to corroborate his conjectures (Whorf, 1956,
p. 162). One can say that documenting linguistic diversity
is a necessary preliminary step to formulating hypotheses of
linguistic inﬂuence. We may employ Popper’s (1935) distinction
between “context of discovery” and “context of justiﬁcation,”
and regard Whorf as engaged in the ﬁrst, while modern
neo-Whorﬁans with psychological training clearly aim for the
latter:
A full theory of the relation of language diversity to thought
necessarily involves at least three logical components. It must
distinguish between language and thought in some principled
way. It must elaborate the actual mechanisms or manner of
inﬂuence. And it must indicate to what extent other contextual
factors aﬀect the operation of these mechanisms.
(Lucy, 1997, p. 306, original emphasis)
Still, Bloom and Keil (2001) ﬁnd faults even with the studies
that follow such a procedure. For example, Lucy’s studies in
object categorization on the basis of shape vs. material in speakers
of diﬀerent languages did not show diﬀerences in 7-years-
old children; diﬀerences in spatial reasoning such as those of
Pederson (1995) can be due to ecological, rather than linguistic
diﬀerences; showing that language is essential for numerical
reasoning (Dehaene, 1997) may also turn out as trivial: “if the
task itself requires that the person use inner speech, for instance,
then any eﬀect of language on performance is considerably less
interesting” (Bloom and Keil, 2001, p. 358). Thus, the authors
reach the conclusion that has been hinted since the onset of
their review: “taken together. . . the available research does not
challenge the mainstream view (ibid: 364)” that language is a
module quite separate from thinking, or even more plainly: “the
language you speak does not aﬀect how you think” (ibid: 351).
We have spent considerable time on one particular paper,
albeit as mentioned an inﬂuential one, not so much because
we disagree with the factual conclusions of the authors,
but because we ﬁnd its style of reasoning quite typical for
“mainstream” cognitive science (e.g., Pinker, 1994), where
notions of (innate) “modules,” “information processing” and
“mental representations” are axiomatic. Since there is no logical
possibility for language to inﬂuence thought (in any “interesting”
way) given such a conceptual apparatus, the strategy is ﬁrst
to split the claim of linguistic inﬂuence into “discourse-based”
and “structure-based.” The former is then deﬂated as a truism,
while the second is demolished methodologically, or reduced to
the trivial variety. Ironically, one could suggest that cognitive
scientists like Bloom, Keil, and Pinker are so inﬂuenced by the
language-based conceptual framework they work with, that their
conclusions are (almost) predetermined.
Our main counter-objection to this line of reasoning has
been that the distinction between “information” and “structure”
corresponds to the distinction between discourse (situated) and
language system (historical) in Coseriu’s framework, discussed
earlier. Since the two aspects of language presuppose one another,
they cannot be opposed as “trivial” vs. “interesting.” Admittedly,
diﬀerent kinds of (possible) linguistic inﬂuence on thought need
to be distinguished, and some may be more pervasive than
others. Thinking of dolphins as mammals might change ways
of reasoning (and ethics), but will hardly aﬀect reasoning in
other domains. On the other hand, the presence of a linguistic
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“structure” such as the obligatory grammatical marking of the
evidence the speaker has for every proposition (direct experience,
inference, hearsay, etc.), a feature of, e.g., Turkish, could turn out
to have much more wide-ranging inﬂuences. The extent of such
inﬂuence is what remains to be determined, but to rule it out is
clearly premature.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF THEORIES OF
LINGUISTIC INFLUENCE
By insisting on a qualitative distinction between “interesting” and
“trivial” linguistic inﬂuence, Bloom and Keil (2001) were in one
way atypical: the so-called Sapir–Whorf hypothesis is commonly
divided into a “weak” and a “strong” version, as in the following
formulations by Brown (1976, p. 128):
(1) Structural diﬀerences between language systems will, in
general, be paralleled by non-linguistic cognitive diﬀerences,
of an unspeciﬁed sort, in the native speakers of the two
languages.
(2) The structure of anyone’s native language strongly inﬂuences
or fully determines the world-view he will acquire as he
learns the language.
Can one apply such a distinction to the thesis of linguistic
inﬂuence on thought in general? The adjectives weak and strong
are gradient opposites, entailing the existence of a continuum
ranging from approximately zero (“no inﬂuence”) to maximum
(“complete determinism”). If so, speciﬁc theoretical proposals
of linguistic inﬂuence such as those of Whorf (1956), Vygotsky
(1962), Lucy (1992), Levinson (2003), etc. can in principle be
arranged on a cline representing “strength of inﬂuence.” The
main issue would be to establish which proposal corresponds to
the actual position on the cline – and if following the reasoning of
Bloom and Keil (2001) it should be somewhere very close to the
“no inﬂuence” end.
We ﬁnd such a gradient conception of linguistic inﬂuence
misleading for at least two related reasons. First, at least four
types of (possible) linguistic inﬂuence – and corresponding
theoretical proposals – diﬀer from each other not quantitatively
but qualitatively. Second, at least three of these types of inﬂuence
are not mutually exclusive or incommensurable with one another,
and could potentially all be valid. A similar argument has been
made in a recent review article (Wolﬀ and Holmes, 2011), but
here we follow the distinctions made by Blomberg and Zlatev
(2009), where theories of linguistic inﬂuence on thought are
distinguished according to two parameters. The ﬁrst parameter
is context. Whorf’s (1956) principle of linguistic relativity is,
for example, context-general: irrespective of the task, context
or situation, some particular aspect of language will inﬂuence
one’s thinking, at least in some particular domains. A context-
specific type of inﬂuence, on the other hand, gives more freedom
to thought, and allows a particular task to be solved either
without, or if necessary, with the help of language. The second
parameter concerns whether features of particular languages
aﬀect thinking (language-specific) as in the Whorﬁan tradition,
or if the properties of language that inﬂuence thought are so
TABLE 2 | Four general kinds of theories of linguistic influence on thought
(with example references, discussed in the text), categorized on the basis
of the binary parameters: Context: general vs. specific and Language:
specific vs. general.
Language
Context
Specific General
Specific (relativistic) Type 1
Whorf, 1956; Lucy,
1992; Levinson, 2003
Type 2
Pederson, 1995; Slobin,
1996; Casasanto, 2008;
Lupyan, 2012
General (non-relativistic) Type 3
Dennett, 1991;
Macphail, 1998
Type 4
Vygotsky, 1962;
Tomasello, 1999
general (e.g., prediction, hierarchical structure) that there would
be no diﬀerences between language communities in the way
that language aﬀects thought (language-general), as opposed to
the diﬀerence of having or not having language. These two
parameters/dimensions can be combined, yielding four types of
linguistic inﬂuence, each represented by a number of theories, as
shown in Table 2.
As stated, it is not our intention to evaluate in detail each
of the theories of linguistic inﬂuence categorized in Table 2.
We need, however, say a few words concerning each type for
the purpose of justifying our classiﬁcations, and to support our
claim that not all of these are mutually exclusive. We should also
add that these categories are somewhat over-schematic, glossing
over distinctions between theories within each type. Still, they
serve the purpose of the main point that we are making: that
language-upon-thought theories do no fall on a “strong-weak”
continuum.
Type 1, classically represented by Whorf (1956), remains
viable as long as there is a plausible “mechanism” according to
which linguistic classiﬁcation can aﬀect thinking so pervasively
as to be available in any kind of context and situation. Both Lucy
(1992) and Levinson (2003) give explanations for how this could
take place: through making the respective distinctions encoded
in the language from the onset of language acquisition, and thus
in the words of Evans (2010, Chap. 8), “training thought” to make
the corresponding distinctions. In the terms of the divisions made
by Wolﬀ and Holmes (2011), this concerns the roles of language
as “spotlight” and “inducer.” Levinson’s ﬁndings that speakers of
languages using (only) absolute frames of spatial reference, also
use these frames in thinking, navigating and gesturing, constitute
some of the strongest evidence for a language-speciﬁc, context-
general type of eﬀect.
Type 2, which is similarly language-speciﬁc, but also context-
speciﬁc, may be represented by Slobin’s (1996, p. 76) thinking
for speaking hypothesis, according to which linguistic structure
(see “Interesting” and “Trivial” Kinds of Language Inﬂuence?)
aﬀects the “thought that is mobilized for speaking.” Slobin does
not exclude more general eﬀects, but has focused on what is
apparently the most obvious context of linguistic inﬂuence: the
distinctions that are made while using language. This may be
a rock-bottom of linguistic inﬂuence, since even well-known
opponents of the thesis of linguistic inﬂuence seem to accept
it: “one’s language does determine how one must conceptualize
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reality when one has to talk about it” (Pinker, 1989, p. 360). Other
theories within this category make more substantive proposals.
Pederson’s (1995) study of Tamil speakers who preferentially
used either relative or absolute frames of reference (unlike
Levinson’s more mono-frame speakers of Guugu Yimithirr),
displayed only a strong tendency to solve the spatial task in a
manner that corresponded to their preferred linguistic usage.
Thus, Pederson (1995, p. 54) concludes that language cannot
be used as “obligatory means,” but only optionally: “Under the
weaker language as optional means hypothesis, the experimental
results suggest a signiﬁcant, close and variable relationship
between language and thought.” Another testiﬁed eﬀect that
could be grouped here as a “stronger,” but still context-speciﬁc
type of inﬂuence, are the ﬁndings that English speakers could
be induced after relatively short periods of exposure to think of
time in terms of Greek-style CONTAINER metaphors (‘large’ and
‘small’ quantities of time) and thus “override” the conventional
LENGTH metaphors of ‘short’ and ‘long’ distances of time used
in their native tongue (Casasanto et al., 2004). With respect to
Wolﬀ and Holmes (2011) classiﬁcation, this could be seen as an
instance of language as “meddler,” with linguistic representations
inﬂuencing non-linguistic cognition diﬀerently on diﬀerent
occasions, depending on multiple factors that for the sake of
simplicity we may call context. Lupyan’s (2012) “label-feedback
hypothesis,” aiming to account for both the pervasiveness of
language-cognition eﬀects and for their fragile character (e.g.,
they are easily disrupted by verbal interference), would also fall
within this category of theories, as shown in the methodological
conclusion: “in may be more productive to measure the degree
to which performance on specific tasks is being modulated by
language, modulated diﬀerently by diﬀerent languages, or is
truly independent of any experimental manipulations that can be
termed linguistic” (ibid: 10).
Turning to the language-general, non-relativist type of
linguistic inﬂuence, Type 3 represents the possibility that was
discussed (and rejected) in Section “Disentangling Language
from Thought”: that language more or less “creates” thought, or
even consciousness. Perhaps the foremost representative of this
position in the current debate is Dennett (1991), with his famous
(if rather mysterious) claim that:
Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes (or more
exactly, meme eﬀects in brains) that can best be understood as the
operation of a von Neumannesque virtual machine implemented
in the parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed for
such activities.
(Dennett, 1991, p. 210)
Macphail (1998) attempts to justify such a claim empirically
by considering (and discounting) various evidence for animal
consciousness. It is somewhat unclear if this implies returning to
the discredited Cartesian view of animals as “mindless automata”
and if this also applies to pre-linguistic children. In any case,
even if Type 3 is conceptually problematic, ethically detestable
and empirically implausible (Griﬃn and Speck, 2004), it is worth
considering as part of the global picture, striking out a (remote)
space of possibilities.
Finally, Type 4 is the muchmore palatable version of linguistic
inﬂuence often associated with the notion of linguistic mediation
of Vygotsky (1962, 1978). According to this view, language is
analogous to a tool insofar as it enables us to solve a certain
task more easily than would have been the case if the same
task were approached with non-linguistic thought. Diﬀerences
between languages may be less relevant (though should not be
excluded) than the fact of using, or not using language. For
example, Zlatev et al. (2010) found that Swedish and French
speakers solved a non-linguistic task involving the categorization
of animated motion events in a similar way when they described
these events prior to the similarity judgement. This was despite
relevant semantic diﬀerences between the languages that would
have been expected to lead to diﬀerent similarity judgments, in a
Type 2, thinking-for-speaking scenario. Also, Tomasello’s (1999)
argument that the “perspectival” nature of linguistic symbols and
certain forms of discourse, mentioned in the previous section,
play an important role for bringing about the understanding of
others as “mental agents” with beliefs, intentions and emotions,
can also be regarded as belonging to this class of language-
general, context-speciﬁc eﬀects on thought.
To repeat, distinguishing types of linguistic inﬂuence in the
manner proposed here may be too schematic, but it serves
the purpose of our particular argument: to show that it is
conceptually inaccurate and analytically impossible to order
eﬀects and corresponding theories in a cline from “weak” to
“strong.” While it may be possible to do so in some cases, within
each cell in Table 2, one would have to formulate carefully the
“metric” for such ordering. Of the four major types of linguistic
inﬂuence, Types 1, 2, and 4 appear to be both possible, and
in some particular cases: actual. Hence, they are not mutually
exclusive.
CONCLUSION
The topic of the relation of language on thought, and in particular
the thesis that language inﬂuences thought in one or several
diﬀerent ways, is somewhat like that of language origins. First,
it has an old pedigree. Second, it fascinates people, and has
over the years given rise to many theories, some more plausible
than others. Third, it has at times been more or less “banned”
due to presumably irresolvable conceptual and methodological
problems. In this chapter, we have above all addressed the ﬁnal
point: it is not that anyone has explicitly banned discussion on
linguistic inﬂuence, in the manner that La societé de linguistique
de Paris banned papers on language origins in 1886, but there
have been persistent attempts to question the viability of the
whole research program (Pinker, 1994; Bloom and Keil, 2001;
Björk, 2008; McWhorter, 2014).
We have focused on four such attempts, and have argued
against them: (1) that it is impossible to disentangle language
and thought; (2) that it is impossible to disentangle language
from culture and social interaction; (3) that only “trivial” forms
of linguistic inﬂuence are viable; (4) that all possible forms of
linguistic inﬂuence can be aligned on a weak-to-strong cline, and
the task is to establish which place on the cline is best supported
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by the evidence. In contrast, we maintained that (1’) it is indeed
possible to distinguish language and thought conceptually, since
thought (understood as “mediated cognition”) is possible without
language; (2’) language is an essential aspect of culture, and
is realized through discourse, but this does not invalidate the
possibility of cultural inﬂuences on thought being separate from
language, and vice versa; furthermore, the notion of “language”
should be analyzed on several levels and perspectives (see
Table 1), allowing us to avoid dichotomies like langue/parole,
system/discourse or structure/information (3’) the distinction
between “trivial” and “interesting” inﬂuence stems from a
particular view on language and cognition that can be questioned;
(4’) at least four diﬀerent types of linguistic inﬂuence can be
distinguished, with qualitative diﬀerences between them, and that
three of these are both feasible and not mutually exclusive.
As they say, the jury is still out on the more empirical claims
concerning the inﬂuence of language of thought, and our goal has
not been to argue in favor of one or another speciﬁc mechanism.
Rather the aim has been to show that such inﬂuence is possible, in
several diﬀerent forms. Our hope is that this conclusion, and the
conceptual clariﬁcations upon which it rests, may contribute to
further careful investigations in order to establish which of these
is actual.
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